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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
.. :~LIA~ T. BLODGETT and FLORENCE * 
_:. BLOCGETT, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
jOE MART SCH' BETTY PURCELL' aka 
* 
* 
* 
* 
?E':'TY PURCELL MART SCH, DOYLE NEASE, 
'ACO CAR WASH SYSTEMS' INC. a Utah * 
:orporation, WAYNE A. ASHWORTH, 
:rustee, KARL W. TENNEY, VALLEY * 
3ANK & TRUST COMPANY, a Utah 
:anking corporation, FIRST SECURITY * 
~~K OF IDAHO, NA.A, STATE OF UTAH 
a~d JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
* 
* 
* 
Civil No. 15608 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment 
;canted below against appellants in favor of the respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On October 20, 1977, the lower court granted summary 
:~dgment in favor of respondents Joe Martsch, Wayne A. Ashworth, 
'arl W. Tenney, and Valley Bank & Trust Company. On November 3, 
:;'6, the lower court entered an order denying appellants' motion 
·:Orr.end or alter Judgment. On October 20, 1977, the lower court 
::o"ted summary judgment in favor of respondent State of Utah. 
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A 11 rem a i n i n g p a r t i e s : <J t '": c: a c t i on '"' e re e i t ~1 e r d i s :n i s s e d ·,.; 1 : ·.: •. 
prejudice by appellants or judg~ent was taken against them. 
the case of Doyle ~ease and John Does 1 through 10, the part1E~ 
were never served. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a finding of error in the lower cc•Jr:': 
granting of summary judgment as to the respondents Joe Martsc~, 
Wayne A. Ashworth, Karl W. Tenney, Valley Bank & Trust Company, 
and the State of Utah and asks this Court to remand the case ca:< 
to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to September 21, 1973, appellants were the owner; 
in fee title of two contiguous parcels of ground in the South 
Salt Lake area near the Van Winkle Expressway. One parcel r.as 
been variously referred to in the pleadings as Parcel 1 or the 
car wash property. Subsequent to November 5, 1971, a car wash 
was erected on the said property. The other piece of property 
has been been variously referred to as Parcel 2 or the grocery 
store property. The appellants had operated a grocery store 
business on the said parcel for many years. The two parce:s ··"'' 
acquired by appellants at two separate times, the car wash 
property being acquired last. 
On April 23, 1969, tr.e appellants executed a tr:Jst :.o-:: 
with respondent Valley Bank ~ Tr~st Company covering :~e stoce 
property. This was pursuant to a promissory note in tne arc 
of 530,000. (Kar: Tenney ~epcsitiJn, Ex.?-6; 
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:c-:l3nts entered into a le3se with Raco Car Wash Systems and 
Purcell, defendants below, covering the car wash property. 
·c leasees proposed to erect :i. car wash on the property. This 
.'~se, by its terms, specified that the car wash property was to 
:c S'Jbordinated to assist the lessees in obtaining financing for 
::.e construction of the car wash. The lease further provided 
··;t no other property belonging to appellants was to be 
.:.eluded. (Edgar Throndsen Deposition, page 35, Exs. P-3 and P-
~)) Mr. Throndsen, testifying on behalf of the respondent bank, 
:omitted that the terms of the lease with regard to subordination 
·.ad been reviewed by the bank prior to the closing of the loan 
'.'lr the financing of the car wash construction. 
:e::icsition, pages 51, 52) 
(Throndsen 
The respondent bank proceeded to prepare the loan 
:xuments for the financing of the car wash. All negotiations 
•ere accomplished through dealings between the respondent bank 
::d officers and agents of Raco Car Wash. (Throndsen Deposition, 
·:;es 22-33) Appellants had been customers of the respondent bank 
':r some period of time and were well known to the bank. 
>rondsen Deposition, page 27) Nevertheless, the respondent bank 
-=:5e no contact with the Blodgetts regarding the loan prior to 
·:c:ifying them of the closing date, at which time the documents 
::r the closing of the loan were in final form. The notification 
.: closing came the same afternoon as the closing. 
:.:~:;ett Ceposition, pages 14-15) 
(William 
On No·;ember 5, 1971, appellants were called to the 
-3-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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respondent bank for the purpose of executing various documents 
the car wash loan. Although there is some controversy about 
exactly what happened and what ·..ias said at the closing, the fac·_ 
must be taken in a light most favorable to the appellants. In 
that regard, appellants were not informed by any of respondent 
bank's agents or officials or by defendant Purcell, who was als: 
in attendance, that any property other than that described int~,, 
lease and known 3S the car wash property was being encumbered o·: 
the trust deed and note. (Affidavit of William T. Blodgett and 
Florence G. Blodgett, dated May 17, 1977) They did know, however, 
that the lease with Raco Car Wash covered ingress and egress ove: 
the store property. (William Blodgett Deposition, page 29) At 
the time of the closing, appellant William Blodgett told the ba~< 
officer conducting the closing that he did not understand fully 
what he was signing and therefore asked for copies of all 
documents signed. Respondent bank failed to provide any copies 
except for mailing a copy of the note. (William Blodgett 
Deposition, page 17) Mrs. Blodgett could not read any of the 
documents because of an eye problem. (Florence Blodgett 
Deposition, pages 12-13) 
Although the respondents now claim that the trust .:Jee~ 
signed on November 5, 1971 by appellants includes the store 
property as well as the car wash property and that it was nec~s­
sary to have the store property as additioral security for the 
loan, the::e is no indication in the loan committee mir1utes o' -
discussion o~ !ddit1onal secu::~tv requi::ements. 
-.J-
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cc~s1cion, Ex. P-1~) Mr. Throndsen himself has no independent 
"--J~J.ection that such was discussed by the com:nittee. (Throndsen 
, _:.s i: ion, pages 29-3 0) 
On July 28, 1972, appellants prepaid some $20,000 owing 
- t'ie .1'..pril 23, 1969 trust deed and note covering the store 
~cJperty. On September 28, 1973 respondent bank issued a recon-
·~3nce of the property signed by respondent Tenney, and 
:3ncelled the trust deed and note. (Karl Tenney Deposition, 
:JGes 51-52, 54-55 and Exs. P-6 and P-10) The bank accepted the 
-o~ey which was not due until 1974 without advising appellants 
::.at the store property was included as part of the trust deed 
:·en in default. (Tenney Deposition, page 65) Nor did the bank 
;~ply any of the $20,000 to remedy the car wash loan default. It 
~' nevertheless claimed by respondent bank that at the time of 
:·.e prepayment, the bank fully knew that the trust deed covering 
:·.e car ·,yash loan included the store property. (Tenney 
:cposition, page 62) 
The note executed on November 5, 1971 became overdue in 
;;,ly 1972 and notices to this effect were sent to Betty Purcell 
"'::tsch on n·..imerous occasions. (Tenney Deposition, pages 23-26) 
:: the same time, the respondent bank indicated to the Blodgetts 
·:at they wanted to work with the Blodgetts to make certain that 
::.e Slcdgetts did not lose out on their property. (Throndsen 
:•:c:sition, page 56; Donald Sawaya Deposition, pages 18-20, Ex. 
T~e trustee sa:e ~as noticed uc ~or September 20, 1973 
-:J-
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at which time respondent Ashworth conducted 3 s3le of that 
property allegedl/ covered by the trust deed. Prior to the sal~ 
three notices were posted, only one of which was posted in the 
precinct where the property was :ocated. (Russel Weaver 
Deposition, pages 7-10, Ex. P-1) The date, time and place oE :'.' 
same was for September, 20, 1973 at 10:00 a.m. and the sale '"'as 
to be for cash at the time of the sale. In fact, the money was 
not transferred until September 21, 1973 at about 9:00 a.m. 
(Sawaya Deposition, pages 10-11, Ex. F) No postponement was 
given by public declaration as that is set forth in Utah Code 
Annotated §57-1-27. 
The description of the property of the car wash as 
stated in the notice of sale and also as it appeared in the Dall;' 
Record as a published notice, describes the property as follows 
(after giving the starting point): "South 89 degrees 15'45" Wes: 
71.67 ft; North 0 degrees 20'50" East 0 degrees, 17'45" West 1:4 
ft to Beginning." (Weaver Deposition, Exhibit P-2; Ashworth 
Deposition, Exhibit P-3) The true description of the car wash 
property is (after stating the point of beginning): "South 69 
degrees 15'45" West 71.67 ft; North O degrees 20'50" East 154 ft; 
North 89 degrees 15'45" East 71.53 feet; South 0 degrees 17'45" 
West 154 ft. to Beginning." In other words, two courses of the 
metes and bounds description were left off and the description·' 
the property to be sold was totally unclear, contrary to the 
require~e~ts of Utah Code Annotated §57-1-25. 
The purchaser at the sale w3s Betty Purce:l ~artsc· 
-6-
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3::eoring either as an ac:rent or a partner of respondent Joe 
";:·~sch (Pace Deposition, pages .t-8; Sawaya De;::iosition, pages 7-
Respondent Joe Martsch was the common law husband of Betty 
:;rcell '.1artsch and was involved in business dealings with her. 
:.: o!Le time he was a di rector of Raco Car Wash Company. (Betty 
:urcell ~artsch Deposition, pages 6, 58-59, 70; Raco Car Wash's 
:1d Betty Purcell Martsch 's answers to amended complaint) 
;Jbsequent to the trustee sale, the car wash property was sold to 
:~e State of Utah for a sum which exceeded the amount paid by 
•artsch at the trustee sale. The details of the sale to the 
o'.3te were worked out by Betty Purcell Martsch. 
v3rtsch Deposition, pages 82-84) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(Betty Purcell 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT APPLY THE PROPER STANDARD 
FOR DETERMINING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
It is a clear principle in this State that in deciding 
<ether to grant a summary judgment, the facts must be taken in a 
~:;ht :nost favorable to the party against whom the judgment is 
0::g!;t. As this Court has said recently, where a motion for 
:;r,:rary judgment is granted "the party moved against is being 
"''e2::ed wit:iout the privilege of trial.." Rich v. ~cGovern, 551 
.:: :2~'5,1267 (Ctan 19-6;. ':lence a court s:-icu:d ::e careful to 
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make certain that if a plaintiff's contentions and proposals as 
to proof of material facts, if resolved in his favor, would 
entitle him to prevail,. the motion for summary judgment 
should be denied and a trial should be had for the pur?ose of 
resolving the disputed issues of fact and determining the rights 
of the parties." Id. at 1267 
In this case, it is clear that the lower court did not 
follow the proper rule. The summary judgment signed by the lowe: 
court in favor of respondents Joe Martsch, Wayne Ashworth, Karl 
Tenney and Valley Bank & Trust on its face makes statements 
completely contrary to the evidence taken in a light most 
favorable to the appellants. 
For example, the summary judgment states that 
respondents made no representations to the plaintiffs that were 
false or incorrect. This is contradicted by numerous statements 
made by respondents or their officers in depositions taken in 
this case. As one example, appellants were required to sign the 
trust note as co-makers although it was represented to them that 
they were signing "on a standby basis". (William Blodgett 
Deposition, page 38) The officer in charge of the closing 
admitted he could see no basis for the appellants to sign the 
note at al 1. (Throndsen Deposition, page 51) Therefore, with 
regard to the note, respondent bank misrepresented two 
significant things, namely that the Blodgetts had to sign at aL 
and that they were only signing on a "standby" basis, ~~en l~ 
~act, the nc~e on its face shews the a!cdgetts as co-si~~~~~ 
-a-
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·- ;;ote. 
One of the most significant misrepresentations is the 
~c'Jsion in the trust deed signed by the Blodgetts on November 
:, 1971 of more property than the car wash property. Respondent 
: 3 r.~ alleged that the documents were prepared in accordance with 
::,e agreement and understanding of the parties. The respondent 
:a1k had full knowledge of the contents of the lease between the 
:~odgetts and Raco Car Wash. That lease specifically provided 
::r no other property to be subordinated by the Blod<;etts than 
'.:.e car wash property. The inclusion in the t:-ust deed of the 
:~ocery store property was therefore a misrepresentation that the 
~es;:;ondent bank was handling the matter in accord with the 
:s~eement. 
Respondent Tenney contacted the appellants on a number 
:f occasions and assured them that respondent bank was willing to 
:'.iminate the interest of Betty Purcell and Raco Car Wash on the 
:=.r wash property. In fact, the bank's only apparent intention 
'"s to sell the property at trustee's sale and to get the amount 
:'. its note paid out of that sale without any regard to the 
::terest of the Blodgetts. Even as late as August 17, 1973, a 
:etter from counsel for respondent Ashworth to counsel for 
:~pellants stated: "It is the banks [sic] intention to pursue 
::e matter to the extent of terminating Mrs. Purcell's interest 
t~e above referred to property." (Sawaya Deposition, Exhibit 
Both respondents bank and Tenney on various occasions 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had dealings with the Blodgetts after the trust deed note was 1 
default, but at no tirr.e did they tell appellants of any clai:r •-
bank had to the grocery store property. If the respondents 
Tenney and bank really thought, as they apparently claim now, 
that the grocery store property was included in the trust deed, 
they misrepresented their dealings with the Blodgetts by making 
no reference at all to the grocery store property as being 
included in the trust deed or in any way being in jeopardy of 
default. 
The respondents bank and Tenney accepted a prepayment 
covering the entire amount remaining due on the first trust note 
on the store property. The reconveyance was issued a few days 
after the trustee sale without any reference to any second trust 
deed or obligation. By accepting the money as a prepayment, but 
neither applying it towards any default on the note with Raco Co: 
Wash nor informing the Blodgetts that the default on the Raco 
note affected in any way the store property, the respondents t:ar\ 
and Tenney withheld infonr.ation from the Blodgetts, constituti"J 
a misrepresentation of the facts. 
If for no other reason than the misrepresentations 
noted above, the summary judgment granted in favor of respondeccc 
Tenney and bank should be reversed. However, as wi 11 be discuss,: 
below, there are additional reasons why t~e summary judgment 
should t:e reversed as to all parties. 
1 ' 
-- i...-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I I 
RESPONDS~T ~ARTSCH WAS NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASE FOR VALUE 
At no time prior to the trustee sale did respondent 
'~rtsch ever have any personal dealings with respondents bank, 
~"~.ney, Ashworth or State of Utah. All of his dealings were 
:-rough Betty Purcell !'lartsch, the owner and moving force behind 
oco Car Wash, which company had caused the default of the trust 
-.ote in the first place. Betty Purcell Martsch had had dealings 
•:t~ resIJondent bank in setting up the trust note and deed and 
-d dealings with the Blodgetts in arranging for the lease and 
:~~ordination of the car wash property. Therefore, at the time 
:: the trustee's sale, Betty Purcell Martsch, bidding in at the 
::·Jstee's sale in the name of Joe Martsch, either knew that the 
::_ot deed covered only the car wash property or knew that it was 
-:: t'.",e intention nor the understanding of the Blodgetts that the 
o:;re property was included in the sale. Immediately after the 
°':e, Mrs. Martsch made claim to the store property and sent 
-:tices to the store property tenants that Joe Martsch was the 
' -~w owner. She also began negotiations to sell part of the 
, :::~-=rty to the State. (Purcell Deposition, pages 79-83) 
As indicated by the above, Joe Martsch was put on not-
of all of the i~firmities in the sale by the activities of 
3;ent and wife, Mrs. Martsch. Specifically he knew that the 
· ~=ed eit~er jid ~ot intend co convey the grocery store 
-11-
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propertj, or, if it ::lid, t'.'.at i: ·..ias :ir. errcr for it to be 3C• 
included and should not ha?e been considered :he subject of t'' 
truste.,.•s sale. 
It is further apparent that, contrary to the state:r.e~.· 
made in the order of s•ummary judgment granted by the lower ccur: 
on September 24, 1976, respondent Joe Martsch through his agen: 
made misrepresentations to appellants. Therefore, the summary 
judgment should be reversed and the matter be allowed to proceec 
to trial on its merits. 
POINT III 
THERE IS EVIDENCE RESPCNDENTS BANK, TENNEY AND ASHWORTH BREACoE'.: ! 
THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANTS 
Respondents bank, Tenney, and Ashworth, held positior.s 
of fiduciary responsibility to the appellants. Fiduciary duties 
were created with respondents bank and Tenney because of the 
close relationship they had had with the appellants. The test-
imony is abundantly clear that appellants maintained a long 
banking relationship with the bank and with Mr. Tenney, and tr.a: 
appellants trusted the bank and Mr. Tenney completely. Hence, 
with regard to the preparation of the original trust deed and 
note as well as with regard to the dealings of the bank and ~r. 
Tenney in pursuing the defac1lt, the appellants were not pror..~t~; 
to make further inqu:..~y :i..:-lto tb.e ;r;atter ::~ca.use cf t:.!Je1r f~~: ::'": 
complete reliance upcn :enrey ar~ :re car~ t: a:: ~n appel:3~:~ 
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_est interest. The courts have held that: 
Where it is alleged a bank has acted as the 
financial advisor of one of its deoositors 
for many years and that the latter.has relied 
upon such advice, it is a sufficient alle-
gation that a confidential relationship in 
regard to financial matters does exist and 
that, if it is proved, the bank is subject to 
the rules applying to confidential relations 
in general. (The bank] must disclose 
fairly and honestly to the client all of the 
facts which might be presumed to influence 
him in regard to his actions. 
o:ew:irt v. Phoenix Nat. Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937). 
; 0 e 3lso Tone v. Halsey Stuart & Co., 286 Ill. App. 169, 3 N.E. 
:a 1 4 2 ( 1 9 3 6 ) • 
It should be further noted that the bank had already 
e1tered into a trust deed with the Blodgetts prior to the Raco 
:2r Wash deal. The bank was not only the beneficiary but also 
::.e trustee of that trust deed. As such, the bank could not with 
.·.,unity further encumber the store property without explicit 
~?roval from the Blodgetts after a full explanation of the same. 
' :s ·..ias stated in Holman v. Ryon, 56 F'.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1932): 
F.2d at 310. 
A trustee named in deed of trust to secure a 
loan sustains a fiduciary relationship to the 
debtor as well as to the creditor. 
The same court in a similar case said further: 
The law requires of a trustee in such 
circumstances that he act fairly toward both 
parties and in the best interest of each and 
not for the exclusive benefit of either, 
because, after he has acted the right of 
redemption is lost. 
2:..:::11 v. Ballard, 58 F'.2d 517, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1932). This 
:~~:~:J:: :--ias furtho:::r tee:-i e~unciated t:y otr.er- courts. See, e.g., 
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Huff~an v. Gould, ;pp. 64 ~.E.2d 773 (1946) 
trustee to act "for the bes': interest of all parties."); 
Wilson 'J.Haves, 193 S.'ti.2d 107 (Tenn. 1945). See also 35 ,;'1', "-' 
2d ~ort~agPs §17. 
With regard to the Raco Car \'iash loan, the trustees,:;: 
was passed to respondent Ashworth shortly before the trustee's 
sale. In that regard Mr. Ashworth had a fiduciary relationshi~ 
not only to the bank but also to the Blodgetts, as established 
above. 
It is clear, therefore, that the respondent bank, one 
of its principal officers, respondent Tenney, and the trustee 
under the Raco Car ~ash trust, respondent Ashworth, all had a 
confidential relationship with the appellants. They were under 
duty to act in the best interests of not cnly the bank but als: 
the Blodgetts. That they failed to do this is clear from the 
facts of the case. 
The Blodgetts were never consulted by the bank that a:, 
additional property would be required of them for the purposes c: 
the Raco Car ~ash note other than the car wash property itsel'.. 
The Blodgetts were not the ones seeking the loan but were tied : 
only because of the lease. The lease specifically said that c: 
other property other than the car wash property was to be s~c:r-
dinated. ~evertheless, and despite the foregoing, the res-
pondents now clai~ that they felt entitled to include as sec~ri:. 
addi':.icnal property, n·ot belong1:-:_, to R2.cc er \'.rs. 1"'.ar:::c~, ::,: 
T~.ey so, 
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··e 3Jod3etts at the time of the signing of the obligatio:1s or at 
t1~e prior or subsequent thereto. ~oreover, the Blodgetts 
-.-1eJ ot:ier property at the time, but they were not consulted as 
'J whether- t'.1ey would prefer- to have such other property f)Ut 'J? 
.. additional security, if any at all. It is clear that the 
,espondents were guilty of the grossest kind of misconduct in 
:~priciously and arbitr-arily dealing with the property of those 
:J 't1hom they owed a fiduciary duty without their consent or even 
;~,owl edge. 
It should be further noted that as the note continued 
:n default and as the time for the trust deed sale neared, the 
c~spondent bank made no effort to inform the Blodgetts that any 
~'::iper-ty other- than the car wash property was in jeopardy. 
::=•1ertheless, it was clear from the respondent bank's own 
~pra1sals that the store property was worth many times over the 
:3lue of the car wash property. Respondents bank and Tenney had 
; juty to inform the ap9ellants that it would be foolish to let 
::12 property even go to sale. 
At the time of the sale Mr. Ashworth had been appointed 
'.cJStee .. l>.s discussed above, he had an obligation to act in the 
; ==s: interests of both the beneficiary and the debtor. Under 
::.ose circumstances he had a duty to advise the parties that two 
::,:els of land were being sold and that it might be in the best 
.·:erest of all to sell the IJarcels separately. At the very 
.,;~t, r.e had a duty to ad'lise of t'.lat ;Jossibility. It is clear 
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was guilty of a breach of his fiduciary dut; to the Blodgetts. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTA2LISH THAT 
THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS OF NO VALIDITY 
The summary judgment alleges that the sale was 
conducted in all manners required by law. This is obviously ir 
error as noted in the Statement of Facts above. The notices ·.;e~' 
not given as required. The property was ambiguously described,. 
the trust deed, making it impossible to determine what was be11c 
sold, much less whether there were two parcels instead of one 
being sold. 
The description of the property as sent and posted by 
Ashworth in the r.otice of sale is so inaccurate that any 
potential buyer could not determine from the notice how big t:·,e 
piece is. Only two courses of a metes ar.d bounds description 
were given in the notice. 
If in fact there were two parcels to be sold, 
respondent Ashworth did not make that declaration to the partieE 
in attendance. Further he did not advise any of the parties, 
particularly the appellants, whether the parce~s could be sold;' 
two separate parcels. 
After the t:id ·.-as made on behalf of respondent Marts:~ 
his agent could not meet the qualifications of the trustee's Sc-· 
notice, namely tha: the mo~ey ~as to be pai~ l~ cas~ o~ b· 
- l .S-
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: 35 ~1er's c~eck the day of sale. Yet the trustee permitted the 
, 3 ;e to continue onto the next day in violation of the law on 
:'Jstee's sales and of the notice of the sale itself. 
> .. 1. )§57-1-25,-27. 
POINT V 
Utah Code 
THE GROCERY STORE WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF THE TRUST DEED. 
There is not only sufficient evidence to allow this 
""tter to go to trial on the question of the improper manner and 
::rm in which the sale was conducted, there is also sufficient 
,.,·lC~ence that the trust deed covered only the car wash property. 
~his Court in a very recent case held that under the circum-
:~31ces presented by this case parol evidence can be introduced 
:: ir.dicate the true construction of the deed. Jensen v. :-lanila 
:0ro. of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 565 
0
.2d 63 (Utah 1977). 
It is clear from an analysis of the instant case in a 
-~"ut most favorable to the appellants that neither they nor the 
:nk e'!er intended the grocery store property to be included in 
:~e trust deed. Just as it was a mistake (as the bank now 
,~-,its) for the bank to have required the 3lodgetts to sign as 
:>signer.3 on the :-iote, so it was a mistake to have shown the 
:::er~ store property on the trust deed in the form executed. 
: ::3::,..:ssed 3bo·,~e, ':.'.'"'.e :::ar::< never jiscuss'3d :.he store property 
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property. It is w3s not e~en noted on any of t~e car wash 103~ 
Those work papers discuss onl1 t~e c~· 
which is mJch less than the tan~'s own appraised value of 
wash property with improve~ents of $38,000. (Throndson 
Deposition, page 19. Moreover, if additional security was 
needed, it certainly did not involve the taking of a trust deed 
on a piece of property with an equity in the 3lodgetts in exces5 
of 5100,000. The Blodgetts owned less valuable property which, 
if it had been necessary and acceptable to the Blodgetts, could 
have been used. Further, the bank reconveyed the grocery store 
property to the Blodgetts a few days after the sale, which act 
contradicts the claim that the store property was sold at the 
trustee's sale. 
In start, there was no reason at all for the responde~: 
bank to have included the grocery store property in the trust 
deed. All evidence taken in a light favorable to appellants 
shows that the bank did not intend to include the same. 
The trust deed descrices a right of ingress and ejross 
over the store property. An interpretation of the trust deed 
easily permits the construction that the description of the 
grocery store property was oniy for the pcrpose of identify1~; 
the property over which the car wash property had rights of 
Scth:~g ~ore. 
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li1?:-ess anJ 
By reason of the su~mary judg~ent granted respondents, 
.-,~e has not been an opportJni:y to present e~1dence on these 
-:;~':s. The allegation that the grocery store property was not 
:c;r: of that property to have been sold and that the State of 
~ah and Joe ~artsch are constructive trustees of the property 
.~; in the complaint and fully supported by evidence sufficient 
the lower court to have denied the summary judg~ent. That 
'.'·o lower court did not deny the summary judgment was in error 
oc.o this Court should reverse the same 3nd remand the case for a 
::1al on its merits. 
POINT VI 
THERE rs SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THAT RES?O~DENT MARTSCH WOULD BE UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
It is alleged in the pleadings, and there was no 
::·.~r3cictory evidence introd•Jced, that the grocery store 
::);iert1 was ·11orth around $200, 000 at the time of the trustee 
:o.:~. Shortly 3.fter the trustee's sale, the car wash property 
''~ s:ild to the State of Utah for $40,000. As early as the bank 
':;:r01isal in 1971 the car w3sh r:iroperty was appraised at $38,900. 
>ro.1dse:: Ceposition,Sxhibit ?-12) 
'.'.:~:.;,e's S3le ·11as only $30,000. 
Yet the amount bid in at the 
::: the sale to the State of ~tah of the car wash 
resoo::~ent ~ar:s:h ~a~e a profit of 3.bout Sl0,000. To 
-:?-
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not only in light of tne tre~enjous va:ue of the grocer; stare 
propert:,' but also i:i light of '::i~e relationship of !'artsch to ': .c 
Blodgetts. 
This Court 'rias he:..d that a gross inadeq·Jacy of a ~ni 'c 
may be sufficient in itself to note infirmities in the grantor'o 
title (in this case, the trustee's title), Lawlev v. 
Hickenloooer, 61 Utah 293, 212 P.526 (1922). Moreover, such a 
gross inadequacy of price paid in at the trustee's sale can be 
sufficient to totally set aside the sale. Pender v. Dowse, 
1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P.2d 644 (1954); Crofoot v. Tarman, 
147 Cal. App. 2d 43, 305 P.2d 56 (1957); Handy v. Rogers, 
143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960). 
The lower court had more than ample evidence to per~it 
the case to go to trial on the merits because of the gross 
inadequacy in price between the value of the property respondent 
Martsch clai~s to have acq~ired at the trustee's sale and the 
amount he paid for the same. 
There is even a further basis ~hy the trustee's sale 
should be vacated. The agent acting on behalf of respondent 
Martsch was the very person who had every reason to know that t' 0 
trust deed should not have included the grocery store property. 
She further was the very person by ~horn the default of the tr0s'. 
note was brought about. The agency relationship bet~een 
respondent Martsch and Betty Purcell ~artsch lS more t~a~ 
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"<':sc':i ..;as a director of '.':a.c'.J Car ;;ash. The ~ncwledge '.Jf Betty 
Combining the gross inadequacy of the price paid at the 
:~·Jstee sale, irregularities of the trustee sale, and the 
'·:~.owledge of Betty Purcell Martsch imputed to respondent Joe 
1:c,~':3ch, it is obvious that the trustee's sale should be set 
E::le. The appellants have established many elements as a basis 
'or recision of the sale, or in the alternative, a valid claim 
1 ':r :la;nages. Hence the lower court improperly granted the 
'c:i1rr.ary judgment. 
POINT VI I 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF FRAUD IN 
THEIR DEALINGS WITH APPELLANTS 
The respondents clai!ll that the grocery store property 
.,s i,-,cluded in the trustee's sale. In this regard they are 
~-:lty of fra.ud towards t'.ie appella.nts. Appellants have alleged 
;·d, as sr:own this brief, have established) a fiduciary 
::lationship between the!ll and the respondents bank, Tenney, and 
The cases have '.leld that under such circumstances, the 
<2~n nc·,; s~-;i'.:ts to the :::espondents to show that there was no 
1 -~~·~] =.r:d ':ha': t~ey acted iil qood faith. 37 Am. J•Jr. 2d, 
e~i~e~ce in the light 
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~..; i ': '.1 reg 3 r J to res r: o:: .= ~ n t JG'= ~-~arts ch, i t i _; cl-?:: L. ,- "· 
all of the e:e~ents of fraud, defined t1 this court in 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), ha·Je been~"'. 
sufficiently to per~it the case tG go to trial. ~ar~scr. i:t 
acting through his agent ~ade representations, both affirmative 
and by not speaking ••hen obliged to do so, that ·;1ere false. T·c 
misrepresentations were to the effect that the only property 
covered by the trust deed was the car wash property. 
those misrepresentations, which continued throughout the course 
of appellants dealin~s with respondent Martsch's agent, 
constituted a ~ater1al fact which was false according to the 
present assertions af respondent that he is entitled to the 
grocery store property. It is obvious that had the Blodgetts 
known the ;rocery store property was included in the trust deed, 
they would have acted ~uch differently than they did. 
not have paid respondent bank $20,000 to retire the first trus: 
deed on that property. They would not have permitted the 
!.)roperty ':o -:;o to sale and, had it sane t.J sale, +:.'r.ey ....,·ould r.~·:e 
certainly bid in on the pro9erty. By making the false 
representations ;1h1ch she did on teha:f cf respondent ~artsch, 
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··r":.,·c'.' 3n . .J therefore ,;ere induced not to act, all to their 
- J: : J. ,IU •J 3 !713. :j e , Under such circumst3nces, che courts have held 
:·.c;'.: t:1e imposi':.ion of a co1s:ructi?e trust on t'le one i•wolv-:d.in the 
'.:-3ud is ,::iroper. In r<: Estate of Rose, 108 Ariz. 101, 493 P.2d 112 
~972); Goldsb'' ·1. Juricek, 403 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1965). 
Since a ,::iri~a facia case is establish-:d against 
-"s;,:ior.dents ,'1artsch, bank, Tenney, and Ashwor:h on the basis of 
'c3Ud, the lower court incorrectly granted the summary judgment 
" to those four. 
POINT VIII 
THE STATE OF UTAH IS NOT A BONA FIDE 
PURC~AS2R FOR VALUE 
At the time the Stat-: purchased the car wash property 
::)n r'2spor.doent !·lartsch, by its own action it made clear that it 
·" 1ot acc<;>pt the trustee's sale as being c·::irr.plete. As one of 
··.,o conditions of the purchase, it required Raco Car ;.;ash to give 
:~~t-Claim Deed to respondent ~artsch. (Affidavit of William 
-·' ?lor<;>nce Blodg'2tt, dated 1-lay 17, 1977, Exhibit 8) The State 
0:sJ "la:l a title search performed and therefore was aware of all 
=~e defects in the title by reason o( the proble~s with the 
.L ~tsh as ~o the car ~ash 
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ci:le, this cnurt shou~d like~ise reverse the summary jud;ment 
granted in favor of the State of ~tah and per~it a trial on its 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time the appellants entered into a lease 
arrangement on the car ~ash property, they agreed to sujordinate ! 
the car wash property for the purposes of establishing a loan •• 
the lessee. They, however, had no idea nor any reasonable 
expectation that any other property would be included. The bank 
had had long dealings with appellants and they had every reason 
to trust the bank. ~orecver the bank held a position of 
fiduciary responsibility to them because of that long 
relationship and because of the truster/trustee relationship 
establ~shed by a previous trust deed. 
A reading of the trust ~eed docJment signed bv the 
appellants can reasonabl; be interpreted to ~ean that the 
description of the grocery store property was included simpl; t: 
establish the property over which the rights of ingress and 
egress ~as granted. The ban~, through the respondent Tenney, 
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,:,~c: TJt to tenrinat2 the i:1t2r:est of R3co Car: ;:ash and Betty 
:.-~ell ~artsch anj that the bank ~ould continue ':o help the 
.. •
0 :13'.,ts on the property. 
If, as respondents now claim, the grocery store 
~'~p"erty was included in the trust deed and was so included 
.1tentionally, then the respondent bank had a duty to so advise 
:1e :i.ppellants at the time of the signing of the trust deed. The 
,1:< had a duty again, as the note was in default and as the 
:cJstee sale was nearing, to advise the Blodgetts of all the 
:nper:ty which was included. Certainly as part of the friendly 
:ooperation of the bank through respondent Tenney in advising the 
: ::ocget:ts that the bank was willing to work with them on getting 
":J of the lessee's interest, the be.nk and Tenney made 
iffirmative misrepresentations. They not only misled the 
::o:Jg9tts as to what the bank intended to do at the trustee sale, 
:.: also lulled the Blodgetts into believing there was no danger 
1 :: t:19 c:ix wash property. To pour salt into the wound, they 
::Jld ::itwiously tell the Blodgetts had no idea the grocery stoJ:"e 
~:o;i>0r':y was in any danger, yet said nothing. The situation 
:c1ed out for the bank to affirmatively advise the Blodgetts of 
0 i:n::iending peril. 
If the grocery store property was not intentionally but 
•
0 ::q9nt:ly included in the trust deed, then the bank has a 
: 0 c;:.•:c.1sibi~i:y for da::-:ag~s to the Blodgetts because of its 
The langu!~9 =E the trust deed is pooJ:"ly drawn and 
-2:-
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the ban~<. 
The n0tice ·J~ s3l2 ~as de~e:tive in its 
sale. The trustee did not advise the parties that two parcels 
were involved or that the parcels could be sold separately. It 
is clear that t~e :r~stee acted not onl; negligently and 
i~properly but also in violation of his fiduciary duty to the 
appellants. 
Joe Mar:sch bought in at the sale through his agent ,,~; 
had a great deal of knowledge about the whole transaction and 
t~erefore knew or should have known that only the car wash 
property was to be sold. "loreo11er, the agent of Joe >1artsch i1d 
been working actively with the State of Utah prior to the sale 
order to arranqe a purchase of the car wash property. She haJ 
facts to warrant the belief that the sale of the car wash 
property :a :he State would bring around $10,GOO ~ore than the 
Ta make a clai~ now t~at the groc~ry 
store property was also included in the sale, contrary to the 
le3.3~ doc•J;r,ents, contrary to t:-.e ~r.Ce:-standin·j ~JE the 3lodgetts, 
and contrary to good conscience, would be compounding the evil 
done ~he~ ~rs. 3~tty ?ursell ~a~tsc~ w3s ev~~ all~wed to biJ :~ 
behalf of r2s~o~d2n~ ~ar~sch. 
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The lower court ~ad before i: ;nan; facts which, tak2n 
li;~t ~ost favorable to the 3??ellants, :nore than ade~~ately 
:~::-~)t::t a jud9:r,ent Eor t:;e a?pellant3. That the lower court did 
-, 0 t r~·Jie·..; the sa;ne in a light fa,;orable to the appellants is 
J~\~~~s from the record. This Court therefore has a duty to 
r 2 ~erse the lower court's decision and to per:nit this case to go 
:J ~cial on the merits. 
R pectfully Submitted 
;'~,:=iZ.J 
. TON, McCONKIE, BOYER & aOYLE 
\ 3;30 South Third East 
\~alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
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